ПЕРЕДНЕ СЛОВО

Друкуємо працю пок. надзв. проф. Д-ра Петра Ісаїва « При­чини упадку української держави в княжі і козацькі часи », за яку, був би напевно іменований звичайним професором на УКУ.

Разом з мір. Добрянським, теперігиним головою УНДА, вони очолювали католицьких українських студентів університету. Тоді почав він також і свою наукову карієру, яку закінчив як професор УКУ. — Недуга і смерть перервали його трудяще, святе жаття. Всеж таки, він переходить до української історії як заслужений науковець оригінальними творами.

Друкована праця нехай причиниться до утвердження його імени в українській науці.

Празник св. Климента дня 8 грудня 1974 р. Блаж. Кард. ИосифSUMMARY

CAUSES OF THE FALL OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE IN PRINCELY AND COSSACK TIMES [*]

The first part of the work explains the reasons for the neglect of this topic in Ukrainian historiography. The first reason is the currency which the notion of “one Russian nation” had among historians. According to this theory no states other than Russian ever existed, only the center or capital of the Russian state had been moved from one principality to another. Thus, the fall of Kievan Rus’ was merely a transfer of the state center from Kiev to Suzdal and Vladimir on the Kliazma, and eventually to Moscow and St.

The second reason for the neglect of this topic were the populist and later socialist tendencies in Ukrainian historiography. The proponents of this school believed that not the state, but the popular masses were worthy of historical research. These views were in­troduced into Ukrainian historiography chiefly by Kostomariv, and influenced virtually all subsequent Ukrainian historians up to and including Hrushevs’kyi (died 1934). In several instances, how­ever, H ushevs’kyi was able to evaluate historical events from the point of view of Ukrainian statehood (Hetman Mazepa, the period of the Cossack State) and to give an analysis of political systems in Ukraine. Also by his critical use of historical materials, Hru­shevs’kyi facilitated subsequent evaluation of Ukrainian history from the point of view of Ukrainian statehood. This was first done by V. Lypyns’kyi in 1912, and developed by S. Tomashivs’kyi in 1919.

In the second part of the work, the author analyzes the reasons given in traditional Ukrainian historiography and political writings for the fall of the Princely and Cossack states: the views of M. Kosto- mariv, P. Kulish, V. Antonovych, M. Hrushevs’kyi, V. Lypyns’kyi,

S. Tomashivs’kyi, I. Mazepa, I. Kryp’iakevych, R. Mlynovets’kyi, V. Matsiak, D. Dontsov.

The third part of the book is a systematic presentation of the causes of the fall of Ukrainian statehood.

Taking all these factors into account, the author comes to the following conclusions as to the causes of the fall of the Ukrainian Princely state:

1. The absence of defendable borders.

2. Nomadic incursions coming from Asia and operating in the Black Sea steppe areas. The great Tatar invasion of 1240-41 was most destructive.

3. The division of the Kievan State into many Principalities and feuds among the princes.

4. The lack of a strong land-owning elite.

5. The absence of the concept of a Ukrainian crown.

6. The harmful effects of Byzantine policies towards Kievan Rus’. The author points out that Byzantium incited the nomads to attack Rus’, and with the help of secret agents carried out policies in Kievan lands harmful to the Kievan State. By appointing Greeks as metropolitans and bishops of Rus’, the Byzantine patriarch utilized the Ukrainian Chui ch to advance the interest of Byzantium, especially in preventing the crystallization of the idea of a Ukrainian crown. In addition, the Greek hierarchy neglected the development of Ukrainian schools.

7. The decline of trade in Rus’. This was due to Tatar at­tacks and a change in trade routes resulting from the crusades.

8. In a separate subchapter, the author discusses the creation in the 1320’s of a supra-appanage alliance of Ukrainian princes including the Principality of Kiev, under the leadership of Galician- Volynian princes. This, most probably, lead to new wars with the Tatars in which the Galician princes Lev II and Andrii perished. This alliance could be considered as a restoration of Ukrainian state­hood. Thus the Tatar invasion of 1240 put an end only to the Kie­van state, but not to the Ukrainian Princely State, since it existed later as the Galician-Volynian Principality. It united the bulk of Ukrainian lands and was a continuation of the Kievan Principality.

9. The boyars, wishing to gain control of the state out of self-interest, poisoned their prince lurii II, thus giving the Polish king the opportunity to start the acquisition of Ukrainian lands.

10. The principal cause for the fall of the Ukrainian state in the Princely era was not the Tatar attack of 1240-41, but the wars with Lithuania and Poland.

11. In this subsection, the author, utilizing the views of Krypiakevych, points out that the Lithuanian Principality was not a Ukrainian state, because the Lithuanian princes acted mostly in the interest of the Lithuanian rather than the Ukrainian people. This lead to the personal union of the rulers of Poland and Lithuania and subsequently to the incorporation of the Ukrainian lands into Poland.

12. The idea of crowning the Lithuanian Prince Vytold as a Lithuanian-Ruthenian king arose in 1398 and in 1430. This might have changed the course of Ukrainian history, but the project did not come to fruition. In 1430 it was blocked by the Poles, because it was contrary to their state interests.

13. The Polish king, Zygmund II Augustus, severed the Ukrainian lands from Lithuania and incorporated them into Poland. This was done under considerable pressure from the Polish magnates and nobility.

Following his discussion of the Princely Period, the author goes on to analyze the causes of the fall of the Ukrainian Cossack State.

1. and 2. At the outset, the author reviews the causes enu­merated by M. Hrushevs’kyi and V. Lypyns’kyi. These include the difficult political environment, the need to secure the help of Mus­covy for the struggle against Poland, the harsh Muscovite regime (especially after the Battle of Poltava in 1709), the liquidation of Ukrainian autonomy in 1764 and 1781-1783, and an effective Rus­sian propaganda which resulted in divided loyalties of a part of the Ukrainian people, above all, the intelligentsia. Such a condi­tion paralyzed efforts toward Ukrainian independence and gave birth to "Little Russianism”.

3. and 4. The author then discusses the distinction between Ukrainians and Russians and recognition of this distinction at the time.

5. In the fifth subchapter, the author explains how a “unify­ing spirit” between Ukrainians and Russians had been propagated during Khmel’nyts’kyi’s time and during the time of his followers, and what were the objectives of this dissemination. The author demonstrates the falsity of contemporary Soviet historiography, which contends that the submission of the Ukrainian Cossack State to the protection of the Muscovite Tsar (accomplished by Khmel’- nyts’kyi in 1654) was an “eternal dream” of the Ukrainian nation. In reality, this submission was only a pragmatic political calcula­tion in order to obtain military assistance in the struggle against the Poles.

6. The author then concentrates on the main literary propa­gator of the “unifying spirit”, the historical textbook of the "Slavono- Russian nation”, the Synopsis.

7. The author gives examples of people who were fully natio­nally conscious, as well as others who had politically divided loyal­ties. The political conditions of the period changed for the worse, forcing Ukrainian leaders to modify or compromise their political convictions and to form a set of political tenets which would be acceptable within the framework of Russian autocracy.

8. The Orthodox faith, shared in common with Russia, exerted a great influence on Ukrainian political attitudes. It was widely believed that it would be a sin to spill the blood of Orthodox breth­ren, which made an armed struggle against Russians psychologically difficult. This attitude was cultivated by St. Petersburg’s Holy Synod under which, from 1686, the Ukrainian Church was subor­dinated. The Russian Orthodox Church anathemized Mazepa for what from their perspective was treason to the Orthodox tsar, head of the Synod and thus head of the Church. From the Ukrainian viewpoint, however, Mazepa was attempting to liberate Ukraine from Russian subjugation, and to create an independent Ukrai­nian state.

9. The Ukrainian political struggle was also weakened by the joint Ukrainian-Russian accomplishment of two Cossack ideals. The reconquest of most Ukrainian lands from Poland occured with the second and third partitions of Poland (1793 and 1795), and the Tatar raids on Ukraine were ended with the Russian incorporation of Crimea, in 1783. Furthermore, the Russian state satisfied the social strivings of the Cossack starshyna, granting them state lands, hereditary property, the legalization of serfdom, and, eventually, membership in the Russian dvorianstvo. This enfeebled the political strivings of Ukraine’s political elite.

10. Despite the political disorientation of many Ukrainians, there was still opposition towards imperial assimilation. After the abolition of the hetmancy in 1764, Ukrainian delegates to the 1767 Legislative Commission demanded the return to the hetmancy and the Cossack order. At this time Russia was much too powerful for the Cossack starshyna to begin an armed struggle. However, after the abolition of the Cossack regiments and the introduction of the Russian provincial administrative system into Ukraine (1781- 1783), Count Kapnist went to Prussia in 1791 and inquired whether Prussia would initiate a war against Russia if the Ukrainians would raise an anti-Russian rebellion. The answer was negative. While such overt action proved to be impossible, nevertheless, at the turn of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries there remained a residue of Ukrainian opposition to the Empire. This opposition helped prepare the Ukrainian national rebirth.